Abstract: Most state-of-the art approaches for securing XML documents allow users to access data only through authorized views defined by annotating an XML grammar (e.g. DTD) with a collection of XPath expressions. To prevent improper disclosure of confidential information, user queries posed on these views need to be rewritten into equivalent queries on the underlying documents. This rewriting enables us to avoid the overhead of view materialization and maintenance. A major concern here is that query rewriting for recursive XML views is still an open problem. To overcome this problem, some works have been proposed to translate XPath queries into nonstandard ones, called Regular XPath queries. However, query rewriting under Regular XPath can be of exponential size as it relies on automaton model. Most importantly, Regular XPath remains a theoretical achievement. Indeed, it is not commonly used in practice as translation and evaluation tools are not available. In this paper, we show that query rewriting is always possible for recursive XML views using only the expressive power of the standard XPath. We investigate the extension of the downward class of XPath, composed only by child and descendant axes, with some axes and operators and we propose a general approach to rewrite queries under recursive XML views. Unlike Regular XPath-based works, we provide a rewriting algorithm which processes the query only over the annotated DTD grammar and which can run in linear time in the size of the query. An experimental evaluation demonstrates that our algorithm is efficient and scales well. La plupart des travaux existant autour du contrôle d'accès des documents XML se basent sur la définition d'une vue pour chaque utilisateur qui représente les parties des données dont il est autorisé à lire et/ou modifier. Cette vue est le résultat de l'annotation de la grammaire associée au document XML (par exemple une DTD) par différentes conditions d'accès exprimées sous forme d'expressions XPath. Pour empêcher l'accès à des données confidentielles -cachées par la vue -, chaque requête posée par l'utilisateur sur la vue doit être réécrite pour qu'elle soit évaluée en toute sécurité sur le document original. Cette réécriture permet d'éviter le coût de la matérialisation et de la maintenance de la vue. Cependant, la réécriture des requêtes XPath dans le cas des vues XML récursives reste un probleme ouvert. Pour pallier à ce problème, certains travaux ont proposé de travailler avec un langage de requêtes non-standard, appelé "Regular XPath". Néanmoins, le langage "Regular XPath" reste au stade théorique car aucun outil d'évaluation n'est disponible en pratique. Une implé-mentation de ce langage est basée sur les automates, ce qui peut engendrer une complexité de réécriture exponentielle. Dans ce papier, nous montrons que la réécriture des requêtes XPath dans le cas des vues XML récursives est possible sans passer par des transformations vers d'autres langages (tel que "Regular XPath"), et peut être faite en temps linéaire. Nous étudions l'extension du fragment XPath, appelé en anglais downward class (composé seulement par les axes child et descendant), par certains axes et opérateurs XPath. En nous basant sur cette extension, nous proposons un modèle général pour réécrire des requètes XPath pour des vues XML arbitraires, récursives ou non. Une phase d'expérimentation montre bien l'efficacité ainsi que le passage à l'échelle de notre algorithme de réécriture.
Introduction
XML has become the standard of representation and exchange of data across the web. With this emergence, a challenge is raised with regards to the security of XML documents whose content is available to one or more users based on their access privileges. First access control models for securing XML have been proposed in [7, 10, 16] . However, these models suffer from various limitations. They can cause leakage of sensitive information [7] , focus on the annotation of the entire XML data to deal with the static analysis limitations [10] , or based on costly schemes for rewriting user queries [16] .
To avoid these problems, the notion of XML security views was studied by Fan et al. [4] . We briefly review the main principle of the XML security viewbased approaches. We start by the fragment of XPath, called downward class, where the axes are limited to child and descendant axes. We use this fragment since it is commonly used in practice. A conform XML document T w.r.t a DTD D (i.e. T is an instance of D), can be queried simultaneously by different users. For each class of users a security view is defined by annotating D with some access conditions to specify the (in)accessible element types of the DTD. The annotated version of D is later sanitized by removing the inaccessible element types which results in a DTD view D v . Then the security view is defined as V =(D v , σ) where D v is given to the users, which describes accessible data they are able to see, and σ is a function used to extract for each XML document T conforms to D, its view T v representing only authorized data of the users. Each query over the view T v is translated into an equivalent one in order to be evaluated over the original data T.
Problem Statement. The problem of XPath queries rewriting studied in this paper is defined as follows:
Given a DTD D, an XML security view V =(D v , σ), and an XPath query Q over D v . The rewriting problem consists in defining a rewriting function R that computes another XPath query R(Q) over the original document D such that: for any instance T of D and its view T v computed w.r.t V , the evaluation of Q on T v yields the same result as the evaluation of R(Q) on T.
Most of the security view-based approaches of XPath queries rewriting deal only with non-recursive DTDs [4, 9, 11] . A DTD is recursive iff at least one of its elements is defined (directly or indirectly) in terms of itself. Note that recursive DTDs often arise when specifying medicals data and the problem of query rewriting is more intriguing in this case. A security view is recursive, if its view D v is recursive.
For each pair of element types A and B in the DTD, the σ function is an XPath expression denoting the set of paths to reach an element B from an element A in the DTD view (where some element types are hidden between A and B and generated by σ). However, in the case of recursive DTDs, the σ function is not computable since there may be an infinite set of paths from A to B and the notion of security view (as defined above) cannot be used in queries rewriting. That is why some authors [5, 8] resort to the use of Regular XPath to avoid this problem. However, Regular XPath remains of theoretical use since no evaluation tools have been provided for practical use of this langage.
Inria
To the best of our knowledge, no practical approach exists for answering queries under recursive XML security views. Accordingly, the XPath query rewriting remains an open issue.
Contribution. Our main contribution is making possible the query rewriting for recursive XML security views using only the expressive power of the standard XPath. We show that extending the downward class of XPath queries with some axes and operators is sufficient to deal with the query rewriting under recursion (without the need of the Kleene star or the translation from XPath to Regular XPath).
Intuitively, for a query Q based on the downward class of XPath, our rewriting solution consists in computing another query Q = R(Q) using an extended fragment of XPath in such a way for any instance T of D and its view T v (computed w.r.t D v ) the evaluation of Q on T v gives the same result than evaluating Q on T.
We provide a linear rewriting algorithm for arbitrary views (recursive or not) which, unlike Regular XPath-based works (relying on Mixed Finite Automata [5] ), consists only in processing the query over the annotated DTD to produce the equivalent query on any valid instance of the original DTD. We validate our solution with a performance evaluation which shows that our rewriting algorithm is efficient and scales well. Lastly, we show how our proposed solution can be extended to deal with a large fragment of XPath (including upward-axes) and to go beyond some limitations of existing access control specification languages.
Related Work. We briefly discuss two approaches of access control policy enforcement for XML documents with or without XML grammar.
In [7] authors propose a formal model to specify access control for XML documents independently of the DTD. The policy rules definition is based on XPath and each query is rewritten by adding a predicate access (which represents all accessible data) to that query. We use the same predicate access principle in our rewriting approach. However, inference of sensitive information can be detected since only the last subquery is controlled among all subqueries parsed by the query. To overcome this problem, we improve the method given in [7] by attaching a predicate access to each entity (element/attribute) parsed by the query.
Vercammen [16] proposes a new method based on the intersection and union of XPath queries to avoid the problem of information leakage. The policy rules are translated to a single query which stands for all accessible data; this query is incorporated by intersection with each query requested over the user XML document view. However, this approach yields the same performance than the materialization of this view.
Other access control approaches are based on the notion of security views and the query rewriting principle. Fan et al. [4] propose the notion of security view by the annotation of a regular non-recursive DTD. The use of only downward class of XPath queries allowed them to achieve more precise query rewriting, i.e. computing all possible paths connecting each two adjacent elements in the query, which provides practically performance gains for the query evaluation. A view derivation algorithm is proposed to compute the DTD view, w.r.t. the access conditions, and an optimization step is also done over the rewritten query.
However, to keep the DTD view regular, an inaccessible element may be replaced with anonymous element dummy which can be source of security breaches. In [9, 11] , authors refine the Fan's model by eliminating dummies, extending the class of XPath queries with upward -axes and with a novel notion of security views. Different types of policies are also discussed. These works can deal only with non-recursive DTDs. They are inapplicable to recursive DTDs because the description of paths connecting two element types may be infinite.
Unlike the XPath query rewriting over non-recursive DTDs, the problem posed by the recursion has not received a more attention. Authors of [5] extend the principle proposed in [4] with a translation of XPath queries to Regular XPath and propose a first algorithm for evaluating Regular XPath over XML data. In [8] , a more generalized rewriting approach has been studied by dealing with restrictions on the class of queries and DTD types. The defined accessibility function is based on the Kleene star. It should be noted that the Kleene star cannot be expressed in the standard XPath.
Although the query formulation and rewriting on Regular XPath is more expressive than the standard XPath, we cannot find any practical system for both proposed approaches 1 . Consequently, the need of a rewriting system of XPath queries over recursive XML security views remains an open issue.
Plan of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents formally the query rewriting problem for recursive views, and sketches our solution to deal with this problem. In Section 3, we give the ingredients of our access control specification. Our rewriting approach is detailed in Section 4. Section 5 presents how our approach can be extended to consider a large fragment of XPath and used to overcome some limitations of existing access control approaches. An implementation issue is presented in Section 6. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 7.
Formal Problem Statement
In this section we present the query rewriting problem for recursive views, and sketch our solution to deal with this problem.
Preliminaries
We briefly review some notions of Document Type Definitions (DTDs) and the class of XPath Queries most used in practice.
DTDs. Without loss of generality, we represent a DTD by a triple (Ele, P, root), where Ele is a finite set of element types, root is a distinguished type in Ele (called the root type) and P is a function defining element types such that for any A in Ele, P(A) is a regular expression α defined with:
where str denotes the text type PCDATA, is the empty word, B is an element type in Ele, and finally α","α, α"|"α, and α* denote concatenation, disjunction, and the Kleene closure respectively. We refer to A → P (A) as the production of A. For each element type B occurring in P(A), we refer to B as a subelement type (or child type) of A and to A as a superelement type (or parent type) of B. If an element type A is defined in term of an element type B directly (B is subelement type of A) or indirectly, then A is an ancestor type of B and B is a descendant type of A. The DTD is said recursive if some element type A is defined in terms of itself directly or indirectly.
We use the graph representation to depict our DTDs where dashed edges represent disjunction.
XML Documents. We model an XML document with an unranked ordered finite node-labeled tree, also called XML Tree. Let Σ be a finite set of node labels, an XML tree T over Σ is a structure defined as [15] :
where N is the set of nodes, R ↓ ⊆ N × N is the parent-child relation, R → ⊆ N × N is a successor relation on (ordered) siblings, and L : N → Σ assigns a label to each node.
An XML document T conforms to a DTD D if the following conditions hold: (i) the root of T is the unique node labeled with root; (ii) each node in T is labeled either with element type A, called A element, or with str, called text node; (iii) for each node n of type A and with k ordered children n 1 , ..., n k , the word L(n 1 ), ..., L(n k ) belongs to the regular language defined by P(A); (iv) each text node carries a string value (PCDATA) and is the leaf of the tree. We call T an instance of D if T conforms to D. In the DTD instances depicted in our figures, we use X i to distinguish between elements of the same type X.
XPath Queries. We introduce the downward class of XPath queries referred to as X and defined as follows: where label refers to element type in Ele or * (that matches all labels), ∪ stands for union, c denotes text constant, axis is the XPath axis relation, and ↓, ↓ + denote child and descendant axis respectively, and finally qual is called an XPath qualifier (predicate or filter ) which can be a text content comparison, an XPath query, or a boolean expression (using boolean operators such as: and, or, not).
Let n be a node in an XML tree T. The evaluation of an XPath query p at node n, called context node n, results in a set of nodes which are reachable from n with p, denoted by n〚p〛. A qualifier q is said valid at node context n, denoted by n q, iff one of the following conditions holds: (i) q is given by p=c and there is at least one element reachable from n with p which has c as text content; (ii) q is an XPath query and n〚q〛 is nonempty; (iii) q is a boolean expression (e.g. not(p)) and it is evaluated to true at n.
XML Access Control Model
We define below some concepts of security specifications and XML security views as initially presented in [4, 9] . Security Specifications. Given an XML document T conforms to a DTD D. For each class of users some access privileges may be defined to restrict access to sensitive information on T. Thus, an access-control specification language is defined to specify what elements in T the users are granted, denied, or conditionally granted access to. An access specification in this language is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 An access specification S is a pair (D,ann ) consisting of a DTD D and a partial mapping ann such that, for each production A → P (A) and each element type B in P(A), ann(A,B), if explicitly defined, is an annotation of the form:
where [Q] is a qualifier in our XPath fragment X . A special case is the root of D for which we define ann(root)=Y by default. 
DTD Recursion Problem
Most existing approaches [4, 9, 11] for securing access to XML documents are based on the notion of security view. Given a security view V =(D v , σ), the query rewriting principle is applied to translate each XPath query p over D v to another one p t over the original DTD D, such that for any instance T of D (T v of D v resp.), p t over T yields the same answer as p over
4 . Thanks to query rewriting we do not need to materialize view T v and its major problem namely the view maintenance. However, only non-recursive DTDs are considered. The security view as specified before cannot be applied in the case of recursive DTDs. To illustrate this problem we give the following example:
Example 2.2 For the query ↓ + ::H over the DTD given in Figure 2 (a), we should enumerate all the paths from the root which give an accessible element H (as done in [4] 
However, the task is complicated in the case of recursion. With the same query over the DTD in Figure  2 (b), the function σ used to extract accessible data, cannot be defined, e.g.
leads to infinitely many paths and cannot be defined in X . Moreover, the rewriting of the query ↓ + ::H is equivalent to the following regular expression: Since the Kleene Star (denoted by *) is not part of the standard XPath and cannot be expressed as outlined in [14, 15] , the rewriting of XPath queries is not always possible. We refer to this problem as the non-closure of XPath fragment under the query rewriting. The closure property is defined as follows: Definition 2.2 A class C of XPath queries is closed under query rewriting if there is a function Rewrite: C → C that, for any security view V =(D v , σ) and any query Q in C over D v , computes Q t =Rewrite(Q) in C such that for any instance T conforms to the original DTD D and its view T v w.r.t V , we have
It has been shown in [5] that the downward class (i.e. fragment X ) of XPath queries is not closed under query rewriting.
Theorem 1 For recursive XML security views, fragment X is not closed under query rewriting [5] .
Our Proposed Solution
We show that the expressive power of the standard XPath [2] is sufficient to overcome the query rewriting problem over recursive views. We propose to redefine function Rewrite given in Definition 2.2 into Rewrite: C 1 → C 2 where C 2 is the fragment C 1 extended by adding some axes and operators. Using this extension, for any access specification S =(D, ann) and any query Q in C 1 over D v (view of D computed w.r.t S ), we can compute Q t = Rewrite(Q) in C 2 such that for any instance T of D and its view T v w.r.t S, we have Q(T v ) = Q t (T ).
The input fragment C 1 in our case is fragment X (namely the downward class) defined in Section 2.1, which is used only to formulate user queries and to define access specifications, while C 2 is an extended fragment of X defined as follows: 
we enrich X by the self -axis (ε), the upward-axes parent (↑), ancestor (↑ + ), and ancestor -or -self (↑ * ), the position and the node comparison predicates. The position predicate, defined with [n](n ∈ N ), is used to return the n th node from an ordered set of nodes. For instance, since we model the XML document with an ordered tree, the query ↓:: * [1] at an element node n returns its first child element, while ↑ + :: We define the accessibility problem as: "When does an element node of a given type is accessible?". It is clear that the function σ cannot solve this problem because of infinitely many possible paths involved by recursive views (see Example 2.2). We show in the next that the accessibility of a given element node w.r.t a given recursive view cannot be defined in the fragment X (even in X ⇑ ). We investigate the use of the augmented fragment X ⇑
[n] to solve the accessibility problem in particular, and the fragment X ⇑ [n,=] as a solution to avoid the non-closure of XPath fragment X in general.
Notations
Given an access specification S =(D, ann), and a document T conforms to D. We define two predicates A 1 ] on an element node n of T returns an ordered set S of element nodes (n and/or some of its ancestor elements) such that for each one an annotation is defined. Thus, with S[qual 2 ] (n A acc 1 ) we ensure that the first element node in S is concerned by a valid annotation. With the second predicate, we use n A acc 2 to ensure that all qualifiers defined over ancestor elements of n are valid (we discuss this restriction in Section 5.2). These predicates are "powerful tools" to solve the accessibility problem as we will see in the next section.
Since the σ function is not computable in case of recursion, the parent/child relation defined between two element types in the query (e.g. query ↓ + ::A/↓::B defines parent/child relation between A and B ) cannot be rewritten in X . Accordingly, we define the two predicates A + and A B to rewrite parent/child relation:
For an element node n in T, n〚A + 〛 returns the set of all accessible ancestor elements of n. The element node n has an accessible B element as parent if and only if n A B . We use these four predicates throughout the paper to formalize our solution.
Access Control with Recursive DTDs
Our access control framework is presented in Figure 3 . For each class of users, the administrator defines an access specification S =(D, ann) over the DTD D. The DTD view D v is derived first and given to the users to formulate their queries. For each instance T of D, we compute a virtual 7 view T v of T to show only accessible data. Each X query Q over T v is efficiently rewritten, using the security view V (defined below in Section 3.1), to an equivalent X ⇑ [n,=] query Q t over T, in order to return only accessible data.
Recursive Security Views
We redefine the security view over an access specification S =(D, ann) to be V =(D v , ann), where D v is the view of D, computed by algorithm DeriveView illustrated in Figure 4 , and used by the users to formulate their queries.
We use first a DTD parser 8 to explore the DTD D into an expressive indexed structure in such a way, for each element type A in D, the set of its children types and descendant types are returned, also the content model P(A) is represented as a tree where all sub-expressions composing P(A) are detected as we explain in the next.
We define the recursive function Exp(A,access) that, according to a given access specification S=(D,ann), extracts the content model for the element type A and for all its descendant types in D. For each element type A parsed by The complexity of our DTD view derivation algorithm, DeriveView, is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Let S=(D, ann) be an access specification, and P be the largest production in D, then the view D v of D can be derived w.r.t S in at most O(|D| * |P |) time.
Proof. For an element type A in D, we denote by |P (A)| the number of all subelement types and operators ("," or "|") defining P(A). The procedure Exp of Figure 4 works over the hierarchical, parse-tree representation of the regular expression P(A). This tree is given using the DTD parser cited above, where its intermediate nodes represent operators and the leaves are the subelement types of A. Each operator links two or more element types/sub-expressions. To compute the new content model of A, we parse all the element types B i (i.e. the leaves) of the P(A) tree to eliminate each inaccessible B i (i.e. ann(A, B i )=N exists). Next, each node operator with no children nodes is eliminated. Finally, the new resulting tree is translated into a regular expression which represents the content model P v (A). 
exp := str ( resp); 
Accessibility
Now we define the element node accessibility based on the use of recursive views: i) The element node n is concerned by a valid annotation, or ann(A, B) does not exist and there is an annotation defined over ancestor element n of n where: n is the first ancestor element of n concerned by an annotation, and this annotation is valid at n .
ii) For each ancestor element n of n concerned by an annotation with value [Q ], n Q must be verified.
Example 3.1 Consider the DTD depicted in Figure 2 (b) where annotation q is ↓::D. For an element node n of type H within the instantiation of this DTD, if its parent element is of type C then n is not accessible. Otherwise, the first ancestor element of n which is concerned by an annotation can be either of type
. This means that n may be accessible if its first ancestor element is of type E or A, and it has no ancestor element n of type A with n q. Note that the element node accessibility over recursive XML views cannot be defined in X ⇑ . We consider the access specification S =(D, ann) composed by the DTD of Figure 2 (b) and the annotations depicted in the edges. Figure  5 represents (a) an instance T of D and (b) its view T v computed according to S. The query ↓ + :: H over T must be rewritten to return only the node H 2 , which is accessible w.r. defined in Section 2.5 to satisfy the accessibility conditions (i) and (ii) respectively of Definition 3.1. 
Query Rewriting over Recursive XML Views
In this section we describe our XPath-based query rewriting algorithm. Given an access specification S =(D, ann), the security view V =(D v , ann) of S, an instance T conforms to D, and its virtual view T v computed w.r.t V. Then, for any query p over T v , the goal of query rewriting is to find a rewriting function that we define as:
Our rewriting function Rewrite ensures that only accessible element nodes are referred to by the subqueries of p, which is ensured by the accessibility predicate of Definition 3.2. Moreover, the relationships defined between each two subqueries of p must be respected. 2 ) time. This preprocessing step is done only one time after the security view V is defined and it provides performance gains during the query rewriting step.
Inria
In this section, we consider the DTD view D v shown in Figure 6 (b) which represents the derivation of the DTD D of Figure 6 (a) with respect to the access specification depicted in the edges. Figure 6 (c) represents a valid instance T of D and its derived view T v is depicted in Figure 6 (d).
Queries Without Predicates
For a DTD D=(Ele,P,root), we discuss the rewriting of queries without predicates with the form axis 1 ::E 1 /.../axis n ::E n where E i ∈ {Ele,*} and axis i is an XPath axis in fragment X . Given the query ↓ + ::E i /↓ + ::E j , it is clear that the rewritten query can be ↓ + ::
] to return accessible E j elements which have at least one accessible ancestor element of type E i . However, it is not so simple in the case of child -axis. At element node E 3 of Figure 6( Proof. The same principle as the proof of Property 1.
Finally, given a (recursive) security view V =(D v , ann), we define the rewriting function Rewrite : X × Ele → χ
⇑
[n] that we use to rewrite an X query p=p 1 /.../p n (where each subquery p i is given with axis i ::E i ) over a node context of type E in D v , to an equivalent one Rewrite(p,E ) defined in X ⇑ [n] over the original DTD as:
Where the qualifier pref ix −1 (p 1 /.../p n ) is recursively defined over the descending list of subqueries of p. For each subquery p i , pref ix −1 (p 1 /.../p i−1 ) is already computed and used to compute pref ix −1 (p 1 /.../p i ) as follows:
Recall that E is the type of context node at which the query is evaluated. As a special case we have: pref ix −1 (↓::E 1 )=A E , and pref ix −1 (↓ + :: if (E i = * ) then The detail of Function Rewrite is given in Figure 7 . After computing the descending list L of p's subqueries, we parse them to generate the pref ix −1 of the rewritten query as explained above. The node context A can be initialized to root of the DTD for rewriting p over the entire document. If p i is axis i ::*, then the *-label is replaced by the set of children/descendant types of E i−1 (axis i is ↓ or ↓ + resp.). Then, the rewriting of p i over p i−1 can result in a set of element types denoted by reach. Moreover, if E i =*, then it must exist at least one element type E in reach (result of the rewriting of p i−1 ) where E i is a child type of E if axis i =↓ or one of its descendant types if axis i =↓ + (lines 18-23) . If the rewriting of p i over p i−1 stands for an empty set reach then the query is rejected (line 24). By fs we refer to the function fusion, e.g. f s({E 1 , ..., E n }, ↑ + ) = (↑ + ::E 1 ∪ ..∪ ↑ + ::E n ).
Function RW_Pred, called in the algorithm Rewrite, represents the predicates rewriting, which is the subject of the next section. As shown above, upward -axes and the position predicate are necessary for rewriting simple queries (without predicates). We prove below that fragment X :E] must return all descendant elements E having as the first accessible ancestor the node context A at which the predicate is evaluated (i.e. the element node returned by ↓::E/A + [1] must be the same element node of type A at which the predicate is evaluated). This cannot be expressed in X
[n] and can be done only by introducing the node set comparison (e.g. X ⇑ [n,=] ) as we will present in the following.
Predicates Rewriting
We explain the rewriting of predicates to complete the definition of our rewriting algorithm Rewrite. For a given query axis 1 ::E 1 [q 1 ]/.../axis n ::E n [q n ], we rewrite each predicate q i over the element type E i at which q i is defined. Given a security view V =(D v , ann) and a subquery E[q] (we take a simple predicate q=q 1 /.../q n where q i =axis i ::E i for more comprehension). We define the function RW_Pred : X × Ele → X ⇑ [n,=] to rewrite the predicate q in X over element type E in D v , to an equivalent one RW_Pred(q, E) in X ⇑ [n,=] , recursively defined over the descending list of sub-predicates of q as follows: The detail of Function RW_Pred is given in Figure 8 . We have seen in Rewrite algorithm that the rewriting of subquery axis i+1 ::* over E i results in a set of element types (reach) reachable from E i . Then, the predicate q in axis i ::
is rewritten over element type E i (E i =*) as explained in the above definition of RW_Pred. While the predicate q in axis i ::E i /axis i+1 ::*[q] is rewritten over the set of element types resulting by the rewriting of axis i+1 ::* over E i . We denote this set by L. For a given predicate q 1 /.../q n over element type E, L :=reach(q 1 ,{E}) denotes the result of rewriting sub-predicate q 1 over E (element types reachable from E with q 1 ), sub-predicate q 2 is rewritten over L resulting in a new set L :=reach(q 2 ,L) (i.e. L :=reach(q 2 ,reach(q 1 ,{E}))), and so on until rewriting q n over L:=reach(q n−1 ,L). Each sub-predicate q i can contain other sub-predicates (case of axis i ::
. The *-labels in the sub-predicates are eliminated with the same principle explained in algorithm Rewrite using the precomputed lists of children and descendant types (Reach). The rewriting result of predicate q can be false if some element types in q are inaccessible (they do not appear in D v ) or some relationships are not respected (e.g. the rewriting of predicate ↓::E i over element type E i−1 is false if E i is not a subelement type of E i−1 , such that E i / ∈ Reach(↓,E i−1 )). Rewriting result can be true (the predicate is omitted from the query) in case of not(q) with non valid q. Now, we generalize the formal definition of the algorithm Rewrite given in the previous section to handle predicates. Given the query p 1 /.../p n where p i = axis i ::E i [f i ] and f i ([f i ] is optional) is a predicate defined over element type E i . We rewrite this query over node context of type E as follows:
is recursively defined with:
Algorithm: RW_Pred
input : a predicate q and a list L of element types. output: a rewritten predicate qt w.r.t element types in L. 1 qt := f alse, f := true; /* content-test is optional, if it does not exists then [ε::E=c] below is omitted */ 2 if (q is a single predicate axis: Proof. Given an X query p=axis 1 ::E ] to check the accessibility of E i and to preserve the relationship defined between E i and E i−1 . This is done in a constant time by using the precomputed predicates A acc and A + as in lines 8-17 of algorithm Rewrite and lines 13-16 of algorithm RW_Pred. The *-label of each subquery (or sub-predicate) is eliminated as done in the lines 18-23 of algorithm Rewrite, and lines 3-8 of algorithm RW_Pred, which causes an additional cost |D v | 2 . For instance, to rewrite the query ↓::* over the set reach, the elimination of the *-label amounts to parse each element type E in reach and compute the union of its children types given by the precomputed list Reach(↓,E) (|Reach(↓,E)|=O|D v |). Next, the *-label of the query ↓::* is replaced by the union of children types of element types in reach which is done in at most O|D v | 2 time. Thus, a given query p can be rewritten in at most O(|p| * |D v | 2 ) time.
Query Rewriting Improvements
We discuss in this section some possible implementations of our rewriting algorithm Rewrite to improve the overall complexity of Theorem 4. The first optimization can be done by avoiding the *-label elimination step discussed above. For a security view V =(D v , ann), an X query Q over the DTD view D v can be rewritten in a linear time O(|Q|). . Thus, the rewriting of the query p depends on the parsing of all its subqueries and sub-predicates which is done in O(|p|) time.
Since the query answering time concerns the rewriting time and the evaluation time of the rewritten query, then the existence of the *-label in the rewritten query can induce for poor performance when some inaccessible elements are parsed by the rewritten query. For instance, given the query ↓::E over context node n of type A with E=*. Without eliminating the *-label, this query is rewritten into ↓ + ::
, and then for each descendant node of n of any element type, the predicates A acc and A A are evaluated. To improve the query evaluation time, the elimination of the *-label in the query is indispensable and ensures that two defined predicates are evaluated only at accessible descendant nodes of n (i.e. whose types appear in D v ). This elimination can give good performance since the size of D v (number of accessible element types) is too small than the size of the original DTD D in practice. For this reason, the precomputed lists Reach can be sorted in such a way the union of the children/descendant types of two element types of D v (e.g. Reach(↓,E 1 ) ∪ Reach(↓,E 2 )) can be linear on the size of D v . Accordingly, the *-label elimination phase, done in lines 18-23 of algorithm Rewrite and lines 3-8 of algorithm RW_Pred, can be efficiently improved to take at most |D v | time and any query p can be rewritten in this case in at most O(|p| * |D v |) time.
Extensions
We discuss some extensions of our proposed rewriting approach to deal with a large fragment of XPath queries, and to overcome some limitations of existing access specifications languages.
Upward-axes Rewriting
For the rewriting of upward-axes (↑ and ↑ + ), we extend the algorithms Rewrite and RW_Pred without increasing the complexity of the global rewriting (as explained in Theorem 4). In Rewrite, pref ix −1 (p 1 /.../p i ) is defined over upward-axes as follows:
In RW_Pred, an intermediate predicate q i /../q n (q i =axis i ::E i [f i ]) is rewritten over element type E i−1 in case of upward-axes as follows:
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Revision of Access Specifications
The node accessibility w.r.t the specification value [Q ] has been defined with two different meanings [4, 9] . Like in [4] , we have assumed in the definition of the element node accessibility that for each element node n concerned by an annotation of value [Q], if Q is not valid at n (i.e. n Q) then n and all its descendant elements are not accessible, even if there is some valid annotations defined over these descendants (condition (ii ) of Definition 3.1). However, in [9] the element node n can be not accessible (i.e. n Q), but one of its descendant element B can be accessible if it is concerned by a valid annotation.
We assume that both meanings are useful and an access control specification language must provide the definition of each of them. For this reason, we redefine the access specification of Definition 2.1 as follows:
Definition 5.1 An access specification S is a pair (D, ann) consisting of a DTD D and a partial mapping ann such that, for each production A → P (A) and each element type B in P(A), ann(A,B), if explicitly defined, is an annotation of the form:
Given an element node n of type B with parent node of type A, then with the specification values N and [Q], accessibility overwriting is allowed under n even though ann(A,B )=N or ann(A,B )=[Q] and n Q. The semantics of the new specification values N h and [Q ] h are given as follows. If the element node n is concerned by an annotation with value N h , then no overwriting of this value is permitted to descendant elements of n, i.e. if n is a descendant element of n, then n is not accessible even if it is concerned by a valid annotation. While if n is concerned by an annotation with value [Q] h , then the annotations defined under n (i.e. under B element type) take effect only if n Q. For instance, if a descendant element n of n is concerned by an annotation of value [Q ], then n is accessible only if n Q and n Q. We call the annotation with value N h or [Q] h , downward-closed annotation.
Example 5.1 We consider the hospital DTD of Figure 9 (a) and we give the following access specification:
• A patient can access only to its own diagnosis information:
• A research institute can access to patients whose have "disease1": ann(department, patient) = ann(parent, patient) = ann(sibling, patient)
For the first policy, $name is a variable system denoting patient's name. For a given patient with name "Bob", if p pname="Bob" then all the fragment rooted at p is hidden from the patient "Bob" and any annotation under element node p can be applied since it is the medical data of another patient. Also, the annotation ann(patient, parent)=N h cannot be defined with ann(patient, parent)=N otherwise ann(medication, diagnosis)=Y makes diagnosis information of parent accessible to patient "Bob" as its own information. The same principle is applied with the annotation ann(patient, sibling)=N h . For the second policy, it is clear that a false evaluation of the predicate does not imply the inaccessibility of the sub patients, i.e. a given patient may not have "disease1 ", while its parent/sibling can be affected by this disease and must be shown to the research institute.
The new access specification defined can be taken into account simply by applying the following changes in our rewriting approach. The predicate A 
Experimental Results
We have developed a prototype to improve effectiveness of our rewriting approach. The performance study is done using a real-life recursive DTD and a various forms of XPath queries. The experimental results show the efficiency of our XPath query rewriting approach w.r.t the answering approach based on the materialization of the view. Notice that we cannot do comparison between our approach and the two existing approaches which deal with queries rewriting under recursive views [5, 8] , since they are based on the non-standard language "regular XPath", and no practical tool is present to evaluate regular XPath queries. The experiments were conducted using Ubuntu system, with a dual Core 2.53 GHz and 1 GB of memory.
XML Documents. Using ToXGene generator [1] , we generated set of XML documents that conform to the hospital DTD of Figure 9 and with sizes ranging from 10MB to 100MB. Approaches. A comparison is done between our rewriting approach and the materialization approach. Given a security view V =(D v , ann), the materialization consists in incorporating an accessibility label (+/-) to each element node in the document which is concerned by an annotation of V. Each element node n, not yet labeled (i.e. no invalid downward-closed annotation is defined over its ancestor elements), is labeled with "+" if it is concerned by an annotation with value Y or with value [Q]|[Q] h and n Q (resp. n is labeled with "-" in case of annotation with value N |N h or with value [Q]|[Q] h and n Q). In case of an element node n concerned by an invalid downward-closed annotation (with value N h or with value [Q] h and n Q), the n and all its descendant elements are labeled with "-". After applying all the annotations of the security view V over the document, each unlabeled element node is annotated by inheritance from its nearest labeled ancestor element. The obtained document is called fully annotated document. Finally, the materialized view of the original document is computed by deleting all inaccessible element nodes (labeled with "-") from the fully annotated document and user queries are evaluated directly over this view. Thus, we compare the answering time of the materialization approach (defined as the view materialization time and query evaluation time over the materialized view) with that of our rewriting approach (defined as the rewriting time of the query and the evaluation time of the rewritten query over the original document).
Performance Results. The experimental results are shown in Figure 10 where the answering time of each query is evaluated using our rewriting algorithm and the materialization approach. The size of the answer ranges from few hundred to a few thousand of nodes. Figure 10 shows clearly that our algorithm remains more efficient than the materialization approach.
We observe first that the translation of XPath queries from X to X ⇑ [n,=] does not induce for a poor performance and the average of the answering time of our rewriting approach remains in general less than 8 seconds for a large XML document. Second, a query containing time-consuming elements like *-labels or parent axes does not degrade the rewriting performance as shown with the query Q 3 .
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Conclusions and Future Work
The proposed approach yields the first practical solution to rewrite XPath queries over recursive XML views using only the expressive power of the standard XPath. The extension of the downward class of XPath queries with some axes and operators has been investigated in order to make queries rewriting possible under recursion.
The conducted experimentation shows the efficiency of our approach by comparison with the materialization approach. Most importantly, the translation of queries from X to X ⇑ [n,=] does not impact the performance of the queries answering. We have discussed how our approach can be extended to deal with the upward-axes without additional cost. Lastly, a revision of the access specification language is presented to go beyond some limitations in the definition of some access privileges.
As future work, we plan first to provide an optimized version of our approach and also to use the same principle to secure XML updating.
